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Summarv
:
This paper argues that for most planning purposes the costs
of goods and services must reflect the costs of capacity as well
as the variable costs of production. These costs are considered
in a reciprocal service setting in which the capacities of the
service departments are constrained. A linear programming model
is used to formulate the simultaneous determination of the service
costs including the costs of capacity. Finally, a suggestion is
made that a full cost calculation of service costs may provide
useful proxies of the opportunity costs of the internally
generated service activities.

Reciprocal Service Costs and the Use of Capacity
A business, as it matures, is likely to accumulate an array
of productive activities which were never contemplated when
the company was founded. Many of these activities are added
on a self-service basis as a matter of convenience, or they
are added during periods of short supply, or to assure reli-
able quality, and for other reasons; such activities may well
be continued provided that their full costs are adequately
recognized and provided that management realizes what cost
sacrifices are being made to achieve such convenience, etc.,...
Their continuance or addition cannot be justified on the
grounds that they need be charged with only part of the lists
of costs normally charged to regular, principal operations.
This is true because fixed costs commensurate with the acti-
vity will inevitably creep in to the operating costs structure.
"Creep," Robert L. Dixon, The Journal of Accountancy , July 1953,
pp. 53.
The Discussion of Reciprocal Service Costs To Date
The problem of reciprocal service costs and the need that such costs
be determined by the solution of a system of simultaneous equations was
understood long before the widespread use of computers and the application
of quantitative methods in managerial accovinting [Newlove & Garner, 1949,
T. Lang, 1944] . However, the practicable use of the simultaneous equation
solution techniques was delayed until the development of computers capable
of the necessary matrix operations [Manes, 1963], and shortly thereafter
several papers introduced detailed explanations of the procedures involved
in calculating reciprocal service center costs, notably Williams and
Griffin [1964] and Churchill [1964].
The solutions suggested by these authors were based on matrices which
expressed the related percentages of the total outputs of the interacting
service departments consiimed by other service departments, and their
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approach shall be referred to as the "percentage of operations" aethod.
Although this method calcixlates simultaneously determined, reciprocal
service costs correctly, the firm must reforaulate (and invert) the
matrix of interdepartmental activities each and every tim.e the relative
proportions of the productive and service activities change.
Subsequently and separately, IJiri [1968], Livingstone [1969] and
Farag [1967, 1968] showed that the reciprocal service cost problem of
the firm is directly comparable to the macroeconomic, input-output models
developed by Leontief [1951], in which the suboatrix of interacting ser-
vice departments is like a subset of the national economy which produces
only intermediate goods and services, and nothing for final consumer
demand. This development of the topic, by its reference to the techno-
logical coefficients of production (which we shall refer to as the "input-
output" approach) necessarily focused its attention on variable costs.
The culminating piece of the "input-output" articles was R. Kaplan's
[1973] paper. Following an earlier and similar demonstration by
Livingstone [1968], Kaplan settled the confusion regarding methods of
mathematically formulating the matrix of interdepartmental relationships,
a confusion introduced by Manes [1965] and compounded by Minch and Petri
[1972] . In so doing, Kaplan showed how the input-output approach was
related to the earlier efforts of Williams and Griffin [1964] and others
and presented a definitive explanation of the linear algebra operations
required to calculate reciprocal or simultaneously determined, variable
service department costs.
In a glow of well justified pride, Kaplan [1977] in his Beyer lec-
ture at the University of Wisconsin states, "Perhaps the biggest triumph
of mathematical modeling to cost accounting has been the matrix approach
to allocating costs from interacting ser^/ice departments to revenue pro-
ducing deoartments.''
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In order to pursue the discussion and to illustrate points made,
we shall utilize Kaplan's notation throughout and also we shall use the
same problem chosen by him and later by Capettini and Salamon (CiS)
[1977] to demonstrate a linear algebraic solution of reciprocal service
costs. The problem which is attributed to David Green, is printed
below as it appears in C. Horngren's Cost Accounting 4th Edition,
p. 546.
The Prairie State Paper Company located a plant near one of
its forests. At the time of construction, there were no
utility companies equipped to provide this plant with
water, power, or fuel. Therefore, included in the original
facilities were (1) a water plant, which pumped water from
a nearby lake and filtered it; (2) a coal-fired boiler room
that produced steam, part of which was used for the manu-
facturing process and the balance for producing the elec-
tricity; and C3) an electric plant.
An analysis of these activities has revealed that 60 percent
of the water is used for the production of steam and 40 per-
cent is used in manufacturing. Half of the steam produced
is used for the production of electric power and half for
manufacturing. Twenty percent of the electric power is used
by the water plant and 30 percent goes to manufacturing.
For the year 19_9, the costs charged to these departments were:
Variable Fixed Total
Water Plant $ 2,000 $ 3,000 $ 10,000
C$00G's omitted) Steam Room 18,000 12,000 30,000
Electric Plant 6,000 9,000 15.000
$55,000
Kaplan and C&S assume demand for the final product of 100,000
units and from this demand they generate a production schedule as
follows
:
(OOO's omitted) Source
User ^1 Xo •^3 ^4
Water (X,) - -
_^
120 -
Steam (xO 90 - - -
Electric!ty (X3) - 90 - -
Paper ^-4^ 60 90 480 -
Totals 150 180 600 100
gals. cubic ft. K.W.h. units
The "true" or simultaaeouslv determined costs of water, steam and
electricity respectively proceed from the solution of the following system:
X = V + AX
,
X - AX => V
X = CI-A)"-^
th
where j ' term of (a s 1) vector X, represents the increase in
total service departmental cost for production of one ad-
ditional unit of service from the j " department,
V is an (m x 1) vector, v^ is the traceable variable cost
per unit of ser^/ice department j, and
A is an (m s m) matrix, a. . being the number of units of
service department j required for each unit of output for
service department i.
In this problem
.3
.5
.15
and V =
$ 13.33
$100.00
:? 10. QU
As solved correctly by Kaplan and CSS, per unit costs of water, steam
and electricity are 535.46, $117.73, $27.70 respectively for this system.
As elegant and 33 useful as the Kaplan article is in the development
of the cost allocation methodology.', it fails to consider a major part of
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the above problem and of service department cost calculations in general,
namely that of non-variable costs, that of costs of capacity. A central
consideration, after all, in the creation and operation of many, if not
most service departments, is the acquisition of a large piece of equip-
ment, such as a power generating unit, a pumping s^/stem, a printing
press, xerox machines or a computer; and the cost of computing services,
for example, certainly should include the cost of buying or leasing the
equipment and the expense of compensating the computer center super-
vision. '
Ijiri, Livingstone and Farag at various points do show how matrices
based on the Williams and Griffin "percentage of operations" approach
can be used to determine full-cost, reciprocal service costs. And the
C&S paper sho-s^ how avoidance of some semi variable overhead costs can
be achieved by the correct computation of reciprocal service costs in
a make or buy situation. However, most of the above cited literature
omits discussion of fixed costs and no one has explicitly considered
the reciprocal costs of a service department, the operations of which
are approaching or have already reached capacity.
A Linear Programming Formulation of the Reciprocal
Ser^/ice Cost Problan and the Costs of Capacity
We now take the same problem and reformulate it for the final out-
put of 100 units used by Kaplan, CiS and for the additional datum of
a contribution margin for paper of $700 per unit of output. We can now
formulate this problem as follows:*"
7
"This approach was suggested to us by Professor John 3. Hughes.
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Problem '/I
Max -13
,
.33 x^ - 100 x^ - 10 x^ a. 700 X,
4
S.T. CD ^1 - -5 ^2 - .6 x^ =
C2) x^ - .15 x^ - .9 x^ s
C3) - ,.8 x^ ^
-3
- 4.8 X,
4
=
(4) ^4 < 100
and all x/s >
The first three constraints are identities stating the respective
technological relationships of x- , x- and x- to other ser/ice products
and to final output, x, , and constraint (4) is the vector of final
output demand [one product only for this problem] . In this form the
expression of the problen is essentially definitional or even tauto-
logical since the convex set can be shown to be a point in 4 space.
However, what we are interested in mostly in this formulation are the
values of the shadow prices pertaining to constraints (1), (2), and
(3).
As we already know with respect to the values of x, , x„, x_ , the
^ i. J
solution to the problea is:
Output Shadow Prices
X, = 150 Constraint (1), Technological proportion = $ 35.46
Constraint (2) " = 117.73
Constraint (3) " - 27.70
Constraint (4), >iarket Deicand = 440.00
And Profit = 3^+4,000
'-^2 = 180
x^ s 600
X,
a
s 100
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Very interestingly we note that the shadow prices for constraints (1),
(2) and (3) are the vector of service department unit costs calculated
by Kaplan and C&S. That this must be so can be seen by examination of
the dual of Problem 1 [see Jensen, 1968, pp. 426-7],
Min lOOy,
4
S.T. (1)
^1 .8y3 >_ - 13.33
(2) -.Sy^ + 72 >_ -100.00
(3) - .ISy^ +
^3 >_ - 10.00
(4) -.6y^ - .gy^ - 4.8y + y^ >_ 700.00
and y, ^0; y^, y^, y,, unrestricted.
The solution of the dual with respect to dual constraints (1), (2)
and (3) is the solution of the simultaneous equation, reciprocal cost
problem. This solution is not affected by the price of the firm's final
product, i.e., the $700 contribution margin of x, , nor is it in any way
influenced by the demand vector of final output, i.e., 100 units of x,
.
But this is only true because we have assumed that there is unlimited
capacity for all service required by final production . Is that a real-
istic assumption and what will happen to these reciprocal costs if any
capacity limitations whatsoever are introduced?
Let us next consider problems 2-A, 2-B and 2-C in which, one by
one, service department capacitqes are constrained in such a way that
x^ <_ 140, x^ <_ 175 and x. <_ 590. Table 1 records the results of the
solution of these three separate cases and those of a subsequent case
to be considered later.
Insert Table 1 about here
Again shadow prices 1 through 3 represent the reciprocal service
costs of the service center outputs. At first glance it is difficult to
see how a per unit cost of §35.46 for x- can soar to 5347.50 when x^
capacity becomes binding. But the new shadow price can be shown to be
the solution of
*
, ,-1 *
X = [1-A] • V
Where $ 13.33 + 292.33
V = 100.00
10.00
That is, the new shadow prices are the per unit costs of the three de-
partaients after the original traceable variable cost of x^
,
$13.33, has
been augmented by the shadow price of the capacity constraint for s^
,
$293.33. Again this can be seen by exaaication of the dual of Problem 2-A:
Dual of Problem 2-A
Min
S.T. (1)
lOOy, + 140y-
-
.3y.
C2) -.5y^ + y^
-
.157^ + 73(3)
(4) -.6y^ - .Qy^ - ^.5?^ + y^
and y^, y^ ^0; 7t^,
^i* ^3
unrestricted.
+ y- > - 13.33
>_ -100.00
>_ - 10.00
> 700.00
The interacting effect of s. on x^ and x_ can be traced to the increased
costs of steam and electricity; for example, steam will cost its original
cost of $117.70 plus the increased cost of x^
,
[$347.55 - $35.46], times
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.5, the coefficient a.., which is the amount of units of water required
to produce one unit of steam.
Here, an important point must be made. That is that the opportunity
costs of all service departments rise sharply if any single one, or any
combination of departments are at or near capacity. Under normal condi-
tions, we can expect that in the well managed, going concern at least
some service departments would be operating near or at full capacity.
As Dixon pointed out, make or buy decisions which should rely solely
en simultaneously determined variable costs will be very rare.
"If the company is in a position to make permanent additions
to its side activities without adding to its fixed costs,
something must be out of order. Fixed costs reflect capacity
to operate (author's italics), and they appear throughout
the organization. Evidently if fixed costs can be ignored
in such a calculation, the company is overequipped and over-
staffed for its regular work [pp. 49]."
R. Anthony, in a discussion of a well known managerial accovmting case,
Martall Blanket, points out that in a practical sense management should
not think of shadow prices only when capacity is already completely
occupied but instead should think in such terms whenever any major ad-
3dition to activities would utilize remaining slack.
3
Anthony, R. A. and J. S. Reece, Managerial Accounting; Test and
Cases
,
5th Ed., [1975], In the solution to the Martall Blanket Case,
p. 605, Anthony points out, "that a company does not have to be at
full capacity before it switches from a contribution-analysis approach
to a normal-pricing approach.... (I know of a steel company that sold
its last increment of "excess" capacity to an auto producer at less than
normal margin, only to have a nation-wide sceel shortage occur mouths
later. The result was a loss of tens of thousands of dollars...").
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A paradox ; One particularly interesting result can be observed
when one or niore service departments are at capacity. Consider Problem
2-A, in which the water department is at full capacity. Without at least
150 units of water, :c. , demand for 100 units of paper, x, , cannot be sat-
isfied. The obvious alternatives facing the firm, if either alternative
is available, is to add capacity to the constrained water department
or to go outside and buy up to 10 units of water. Any acquisition of
water at a cost of less than $347.50 per unit will add to the total
profit of the firm. However, a still better avenue of increasing
profit may exist: e.g., to purchase steam! If additional water is
not readily available, any price less than $273.75 per unit for steam,
will relieve the demand for water and increase profit. Problem 3 il-
lustrates such a situation.
Problem 3
-13.33 X - 100 X- - 10 x_ + 70U x. - 200 x.
2 3 4
x^ - .5 x^ - .6 x, "0
x^ =»
=
x^ ± 100
<_ 140
all X, ' 3 ^0
J
where x^ is purchased steam and 3200 is its per unit cost.
The solution of Problem 3, presented in Table 1, increases profit
by $750. Depending on the relative prices of x,
,
s^ and x„ and the
amounts used in their input-output relationship, it may be optimal to
M3T
S.T. (1)
^1
C2)
(3) - .3 s,
(4)
C5) ^1
-^2 ""
-3 T /
^^2 ^
=^2
•
-
.15 x_ -
.9-4
^3 - 4 .3 X,
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buy more of a service which is already in excess capacity (180 units vs.
168 units) at a price higher than the simultaneously determined per
unit cost of the purchased service (e.g., $200.00 vs. ?117.73).
The Relationship of Opportunity Costs to
Fixed Costs and to Full Costing
Referring back to the example problem, we know that the profit that
has been maximized is actually the direct costing, gross margin of the
firm, i.e., that v is the price less direct variable costs per unit of
X, and that v, , v„, and v. are the traceable direct variable costs of
4 12 3
service departments 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The price of paper is set
high enough to cover all out-of-pocket fixed costs per period and some
allocation of sunk fixed costs and also to yield a profit. The shadow
prices of the capacity constraints, (which multiplied times postive-
valued right hand side constraint value, b.s equal profit), thus in-
clude fixed costs but they do so only in a very situation-specific way
in that the fixed costs are reflected through the price of the paper
and all fixed costs are charged to the service department whose capacity
is binding. Supplemented by sensitivity analysis, shadow prices provide
the necessary relevant data to the Immediate shx)rt tun, but they do not
provide us with very useful calculations of reciprocal service costs
for longer run planning.
There are three reasons for which the shadow prices related to the
services department technological constraints may prove inadequate for
furnishing useful costs for planning. The first, referred to in the
previous paragraph is that they include an amount equal to the profit
of the firm which uses the services. This is not the most serious
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difficulty and it can be adjusted for by recalculating the optimal solu-
tions of Problem 2-A, 2-3, and 2-C at a break even price for paper, $550
per unit for 100 units of the final product.
As a result of a break even price for paper, that part of Table 1
which reported the service departaent costs augmented by capacity con-
straints to shadow prices has to be adjusted downwards as shown in
Table 2,
Insert Table 2 about here
On this point Prof. Dixon argued that
"to justify the addition of a permanent new activity on
the grounds of cost savings, the best available supplier's
price must be shown not only to exceed the full cost of
production, with no apportionable costs cnitted, but it
should be higher by an amount at least equal to the rate
of profit which the company is able to make through its
principal operation" (author's italics) (p. 53).
If one agrees with Dixon, no adjustment for profit woiild be necessary.
rh.3 second reason for being cautious in the use of shadow prices
as costs is related to the mathematical nature of their calculation.
?or ever;' constraint in the L.P. solution there is a basic variable
and a shadow price; and for ever;^ ^on-slack, basic variable there is
a positive shadow price. In the problem esamined above, there are
three kinds of constraints: 1) there are technological constraints,
m in all, one for each ser-zice department; 2) there are m or less con-
straints corresponding to the capacities of the ser-zice departments;
and 3) there are n or less market constraints for the n final products,
the demand vector of final output. However there can only be m + n
or less non-slack basic variables with positive values and given the
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reciprocal, input-output nature of the service departments, for any
positive final output at all there will necessarily exist m technolog-
ical constraint shadow prices. That means there remain only n shadow
prices to be calculated for both the n or less marketing constraints
and for the m or less service department capacity constraints.
As a result of these limits, under certain conditions it is possible
for a service department capacity to be binding but to have a zero sb-adow
price. In fact in parts 2-A, B and C, should two or more service depart-
ments ever operate at full capacity simultaneously in the production of
paper, a degenerate solution results. Specifically, one ore more of
the slack variables, for constrained service department capacity remain
in the basis at a zero value and, consequently their related shadow prices
have zero values, all of the profit being imputed to the other service
department via capacity constraints and/or market constraints. There
being no shadow price for these ser"7ice departments, no cost is attrib-
* _i *
uted to the department in the solution of X = [I - A] v . The result-
ing amovmts calculated for reciprocal costs of service departments aug-
mented for capacity costs can thus vary, depending on a tie-breaking
rule in the L.P. algorithm rather than on the intrinsic costs of the
service departments. In general, the problem of degeneracy and the
resulting unsatisfactory conditions are more likely to result when m
is larger than n.
The third reason for rejecting shadow prices for more than short
run decision making purposes, i.e., for calculating standards or long
run costs is also related to the nature of the mathematical solution
of the L.P. problem. Shadow prices only appear when capacity is reached;
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the shadow prices act like a cattleprod or electrified fence or an alarm
at point of contact and not like a radar system which signals the ap-
proach of full capacity/. Unlike the results of marginal analysis, in
which solution values shift gradually for continuous functions, shadow
prices change abruptl^^ as solutions move from one extreme point on the
convex set to another. For this same reason, shadow prices have not
proved practical for transfer price determination [Manes, 1970]. And
as Dcpuch and Drake [1964] have pointed out the L.P. algorithm does not
discriminate between marketing or capacity constraint.
And so, although we concur with Prof. Dixon's [1953, p. 50] position
"that Ccapacity) fixed costs simply cannot be ignored in making the
produce-or-purchase decision unless one is satisfied with a very short
sighted analysis," for the above reasons shadow prices will often fail
to make an appropriate provision for fixed costs.
Since we are not satisfied with shadow prices as service department
costs, we are reduced to examining the full cost reciprocal cost. Re-
sorting again to the paper company problem, we adjust the traceable cost
vector V to include a "per unit" capacity cost. As Abel [1978] argues,
capacity is created in anticipation of a certain volume of production
and therefore the capacity costs should be allocated on the basis of
4planned utilization rather than on the basis of actual utilization.
4
We are mainly concerned with determination of long run costs for
planning- Should the actxial production deviate from the planned utiliza-
tion volumes, variances will arise. Z:camination of the variances is also
a managerial responsibility which is not discussed in this paper.
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As Kaplan points out, the production schedule of service center
output will flow from the firm's planned needs for final output
(Q = UP(I - A) * where U is the (1 x n) vector of demand for final
product, P is the (n x m) matrix of input requirements of final pro-
duction for service and Q is the CI x m) vector of service department
output required)
.
Thus for the problem at hand Q = [150, 180, 600] and
*
V =
traceable
per unit
direct variable
cost
-
,13.33 -hI^
310 00 - iltOOO
traceable Fixed Cost
Planned Capacity
$13.33 + $53.33
$100.00 + $66.67
$10.00 + $15.00
$66.66
$166.67
$23.00
* *
Different V s and X s could be calculated for every change in the
scheduled utilization of services but would probably only be calculated
for major proposed changes in the use. of capacity.
*
Solving for X , we obtain:
Variable Cost
Capacity Cost
Full Cost
Service Department Costs per Unit
Water Steam Electricity
$ 35.46
78.04
$113.50
$117.73
105.67
$223.40
$27.66
30.85
$58.51
These full costs fall within the range of costs for 2-A, 2-B, and
2-C adjusted to omit profit (refer to Table 2). For the going concern,
which sizes its service operations according to its needs, such costs
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are far Qore representative of the opportunity costs of the firm than
are a variable-cost-only computation.
One can argue then that, because of the inadequacies of shadow
prices for any planning beyond the next immediate decisions, full costing
is the best proxy of an opportunity cost system. Note that in a com-
petitive economic system the outside supplier of services, in the long
run, must recover his fixed or capacity costs as well. Therefore, the
price demanded for ser'/ices will include a provision for the capacity
costs. For the purpose of long run planning, management must consider
the efficiency of capacity utilization vis. a vis. others in the market.
Often, the use of excess capacity to support new ser"/ices leads to busy-
ing facilities in activities they were not originally planned for. This
view is also supportive of J. L. Zimmerman's [1979J recent paper which
provides additional defense of traditional cost accounting techniques
by showing how cost allocations 1) control the overconsumption of agent
perquisites, 2) proxy the costs of degraded ser/ice, delays and future
expansion, costs that arise when a common resource (or service) is shared
by several decision makers. In that sense our paper is a formal expres-
sion of Zimmerman's second argument.
Conclusion
We prefaced this paper by an extended quotation from a paper written
by Prof. R. L. Dixon twenty-six years ago. Currant research often tends
to set too low a value on, if not to disregard, the traditional wisdom
of the past. On the topic of reciprocal service costs, and of the fixed
costs related thereto, accounting research in the last 20 years has per-
haps allowed the powerful conviction of marginal analysis and of crusading
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efforts against the merit of any allocations— to blind it to the obvious,
namely that the costs of goods and services must include their share of
the cost capacity used in their production. We have showed how these
costs are calculable when operations of the firms are placed in a mathe-
matically programmable model. Finally, we have suggested that a full-
cost calculation of reciprocal service costs provides useful and perhaps
the best available proxies of the opportunity costs derived from the
model
.
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Table I
Reciprocal Costs Under Capacity Constraint*
Prob. 3
Xj_ ^ 140 and x =
Prob. 2-A Prob. 2-B Prob. 2-C Available at
Prob. 1 x-]_ <_ 140 X2 1175 X2 < 590 $200 per unit
z (OOO's) 44,000 41,700 42,780 43,270 42,450
Output (OOO's)
==1 150 140 145.8 147.5 140
^2 180 163 175.0 177.0 160
^
600 560 583.3 590.0 592
==4 100 93.33 97.22 98.33 100
X, ' s Slack
4
- 6.67 2.78 1.67 -
^5 - - - - 18.8
Shadow Prices
Tech Pro-
portion s^ ? 35.,46 ?347.5 $ 66.66 ? 97.87 ? 200
Tech Pro-
portion x^ 117.,73 273.75 377.30 148.90 200
Tech Pro-
portion X- 27.,76 51.06 66.67 105.70 40
Market
Constraint x, 440.00 _ _ - 208
4
Capacity
Constraint x^ - 293.3 - - 154.70
Capacity
Constraint x^ - - 244.4
Capacity
Constraint x_ - - - 73.33
*Note that, because of degeneracy in the solutions, only one capacity
shadov price can be calculated even when 2 or 3 ser/ice departments are
at full capacity. More on this point later.
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Table 2
Reciprocal Costs Under Capacity Constraint
at the Break Even Price
Prob 2-A Prob 2-B Prob 2-C
Shadow Prices x. <_ 140 x„ <_ 175 x- <_ 590
Technological Proportion 1 (347.5) (66.66) (97.87)
241.10 56.00 76.57
Technological Proportion 2 (273.80) (377.80) (148.90)
220.60 289.10 138.30
Technological Proportion 3 (51.06) (66.67) (105.70)
43.09 53.37 79.08
The bracketed figures are the shadow prices including profit (as
shown in Table 1) and the lower ones are the same figures with profit
eliminated.





